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U.S. pursued neutralist or isolationist policies towards Europe resulted in instability
on the continent. However, since 1949, the U.S. has pursued an alliance policy
and Europe has experienced relative peace.
With the end of the Cold War, the United States must reevaluate its interests
in Europe. These interests include the future of Russia, the stability of Eastern
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associated issues regarding further reductions in the defense budget and military
presence in Europe. These issues include the U.S. security guarantee to Europe,
the cost of U.S. involvement in the Atlantic Alliance, the search for a "peace
dividend," and European support for a continued U.S. military presence on the
continent. After examining these issues, the thesis concludes that further
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Executive Summary
This thesis argues that the need for U.S. involvement in European security
affairs did not end with the Cold War. History provides evidence to support this.
Periods in which the U.S. pursued neutralist or isolationist policies towards Europe
resulted in instability on the continent. However, since 1949, the U.S. has
pursued an alliance policy and Europe has experienced relative peace.
Recent changes are forcing the United States to reevaluate its interests in
Europe. The threat from the successor states of the Soviet Union seems almost
non-existent, Germany is reunified, and the Warsaw Pact dismantled. United
States interests include the future of Russia, the stability of Eastern and Western
Europe, the future of European security institutions, and a place at the European
economic and political table for the U.S.
These interests must be kept in mind as the United States analyzes
associated issues regarding further reductions in the defense budget and military
presence in Europe. These issues include the U.S. security guarantee to Europe,
the cost of U.S. involvement in the Atlantic Alliance, the search for a "peace
dividend," and European support for a continued U.S. military presence on the
continent.
After examining these issues, this thesis concludes that further reductions
in the U.S. defense budget and military presence in Europe must proceed at a
responsible rate, if the U.S. is to avoid past mistakes and preserve European
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stability. In the past, after major conflicts, the U.S. reduced its defense budget
and security commitments to Europe without considering what effect these
reductions would have on the quality and ability of its military forces. Keeping
U.S. security interests in Europe in perspective while drawing down U.S. military
force levels will be especially important in the coming years. Modern technology
has made the world many times smaller. Strategic missiles and bombers are
capable of striking targets deep within the heart of any continent. It is no longer
possible for the United States to isolate itself from the rest of the world.
Some Americans favor making larger reductions to the U.S. military presence
in Europe and the U.S. defense budget than what the Bush Administration's Base
Force plan called for. They believe that further reductions are possible because
the Soviet Union has collapsed and any future threat to the European continent
appears to exist only in speculative and "what-if" scenarios. They also believe
that, by spending less on defense, greater progress can be made in deficit
reduction and in improvements to the U.S. economic situation. However, the U.S.
should examine these judgements carefully before accepting them as support for
further reductions beyond what President Bush has outlined.
It is important that the U.S. be steadfast during the transition that is taking
place in Europe. 1989 was seen as a new beginning for Europe. The tendency
might surface among impatient analysts or policy-makers to speed the process of
change, regardless of the pitfalls that may be present. However, this attitude
could endanger the stable transition to a free and prosperous Europe. After
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peace dividends were harvested and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Europe, it
would require massive effort and expense to return forces to Europe should it
become necessary. Steps must be taken positively and decisively with an
awareness that they cannot be easily reversed.
Though costly, America's European investment has yielded enormous
benefits. It has provided years of peace on a continent that, in an ever-shrinking
world, plays a critical role in the national security of the United States.
VIII
I. INTRODUCTION
There can be no such thing as Fortress America. If ever we were reduced
to the isolation implied by that term we would occupy a prison, not a fortress.
- President Dwight D. Eisenhower, State of the Union Message, January 9,
1959. 1
Recent changes are forcing the United States to reevaluate its policies
regarding security in Europe. The threat from the successor states of the Soviet
Union seems almost non-existent, Germany is reunified, and the Warsaw Pact
dismantled. Should these changes cause the U.S. to reduce, beyond what the
Bush Administration had planned, the defense budget and its involvement in
European security affairs? According to Pat Buchanan, "For decades, we
Americans have been carrying burdens and taking risks that belong to Europeans
and they have exploited us."2 Or should the United States continue with the
current plan for reducing the defense budget its military presence and security
commitment to Europe? If so, how should this approach be defined in terms of
specific security interests and commitments?
1
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents
,
(U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1960), pp. 14-15.
2
Patrick Buchanan, "Tripwire. ..or stabilizing nexus," Washington Times , May
5, 1990, p. F1.
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine the hypothesis that the need
for U.S. involvement in European security affairs did not end with the Cold War.
If this statement is true, several questions must be addressed.
Can history provide evidence to support this thesis or is the post-Cold War
security environment so different from that of the past that the new
circumstances do not justify continuing U.S. involvement in European
security affairs without further reductions beyond those currently planned?
What are U.S. security interests in Europe now that the Cold War is over?
To what extent is the presence of United States military forces still required
in Europe?
What are the main issues regarding a redefined U.S. involvement in
European security affairs?
To what extent are the views expressed by those calling for a further
withdrawal of the U.S. from European security affairs based on unsound
premises? To what extent are these views well-founded?
This thesis addresses these questions and offers a critical analysis of the views
of those who advocate making reductions beyond those proposed by the Bush
Administration to the U.S. military presence in Europe.
II. THE HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
AFFAIRS
With the end of the Cold War, is the United States faced with a break in
history? Is the U.S. unable to base future security decisions on past experiences?
What circumstances have caused the U.S. to change its security policy towards
Europe in the past? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to
examine the history of U.S. involvement in European security affairs and the
factors that influenced it. The history of American policy regarding European
security affairs may be divided into four distinct periods. George Washington
included the following remarks in his farewell address:
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle
our peace and property in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest,
humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it. ..Taking
care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for
extraordinary emergencies.... 3
3
David F. Long, ed., A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Relations
(Washington: University Press of America, 1980), vol. I, From 1760 to the Mid-
1980s, p. 24.
Washington's farewell address warned about the dangers of "entangling
alliances" with Europe. Leaders in early American politics had observed that
European alliances were quickly forged, only to be broken once one party had
achieved its goals. Washington's address attempted to free the United States
from the power politics that had dominated Europe for centuries and that was
engulfing Europe at that time with the wars of the French Revolution and
Napoleon.
During this first period, "Europe was almost continually at war" and America
"was effectively a European power." America was involved in Europe's politics,
diplomacy, and wars. America's primary goals were to defend its "independence,
territorial integrity, and commerce in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean."4
Therefore, with the power of Britain to the north and Spain to the south, the United
States was forced to pursue a policy of neutrality instead of the isolationism
Washington and other political leaders would have preferred. As Richard Henry
Lee stated, "We are therefore compelled to mix with their [Europe's] Councils in
order to be guarded against their ill designs."5 To achieve these goals, America
developed a strong militia "to guard against European incursions and a small but
4Samuel P. Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests," Survival ,
January/February 1991, p. 4.
5Lee cited in Huntington, ibid ., who indicates that the original source may be
found in J. Fred Rippy, The Historical Background of the American Policy of
Isolation
, Smith College Studies in History, IX (Northampton, MA: 1924), pp. 125,
131.
capable Navy to protect American shipping against the depreciations of the British
Navy, French privateers and the Barbary pirates."6
As Huntington notes, "In 1815 the Napoleonic threat to Europe disappeared
and a few years later European colonialism in the Americas came to an effective
end." The first phase in U.S. foreign policy ended and the second phase, that of
the Pax Britannica, began. "The United States was sheltered behind the British
fleet and British diplomacy." The U.S., focusing on "continental expansion and
economic development," adopted an isolationist foreign policy. The militia was
replaced by "a small, long-service, active-duty, Indian-fighting Army." The Navy
became less important and focused its operations on "combating the slave trade,
protecting American merchantmen in Asia, and providing navigational support to
commerce." America turned its focus away from European events. 7
America used its geographic location to promote its isolationist foreign policy
until the end of the century when the Pax Britannica phase ended and the third
phase began. 8 During this phase Britain, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the
United States became competing power centers. The small U.S. Navy was
replaced by a large battle fleet that was second to none. The Army became







and War College to develop contingency plans for a major war overseas and also
to the creation of military reserves which could be mobilized to fight these wars.
9
However, even with these changes, the United States wished to remain
uninvolved in European security affairs. Even during most of World War I, the
American public saw the war as caused by complicated politics and inter-
governmental rivalries which were of no concern to the United States. George
Kennan states that Americans dismissed the:
...real interests and aspirations of other peoples. ..as unsubstantial and
unworthy of our attention, as 'jealousies and rivalries' too silly, too
'complicated', to deserve our respect. 10
It was only after Germany's resumption of submarine warfare against
American shipping and the Zimmermann telegram, relating attempts by Germany
to form a German-Mexican alliance against the United States, that the U.S. saw
it necessary to extend its democratic idea abroad and enter the war. 11
However, the end of World War I showed isolationism once again gaining
political force. United States tendencies toward isolationism surfaced in the
9
lbid .
10George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: the University of Chicago
Press, 1984), p. 64.
11




nativist immigration laws of 1921 and 1924, and the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930.
The Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937, helped along by the depression at home and
the rise of dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini in Europe, also reflected
American attempts to turn inward and view events occurring in Europe as
unimportant to the United States. In 1940, America was divided between
"interventionists like Franklin Roosevelt, who wanted to aid Britain against Hitler's
Germany, and isolationists like Charles Lindbergh, Joseph Kennedy and Robert
Taft who wanted America to stand aside and live with whoever won." 12 As in
World War I, it took a direct attack on American security interests to convince the
U.S. that events abroad could affect the security of the United States. The U.S.
was forced to abandon its isolationist policy and enter World War II.
The defeat of Germany and Japan set the scene for the fourth phase in U.S.
policy regarding security in Europe. This phase was dominated by the Cold War.
Isolationism gave way to internationalism. The primary U.S. goal during this
phase was to prevent the spread of Soviet influence inside and outside Europe.
The main U.S. strategy was containment. In order to promote this strategy, the
U.S. had to remain involved in European security affairs. A complex system of
alliances and security relationships was developed. The United States realized
it could no longer afford to rely on relative geographic isolation as a hedge against
European instability adversely affecting the security of the United States. During
12
Michael Barone, "The American isolationist mirage," U.S. News & World
Report
, February 3, 1992, p. 29.
this period, the U.S. built a very large active-duty military; a massive strategic
nuclear force; technological and qualitative superiority in weapons; and forward
deployed land, sea, and air forces in Europe and Asia. 13
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. strategies of containment and
deterrence achieved their objectives. The Cold War is over. 1991 marked the
beginning of a new phase in the international system. With this new phase, the
U.S. is faced with new options in its foreign policy decisions. What path will its
foreign policy towards Europe take? With the threat from the East perceived by
many as non-existent, isolationists are once again rallying around the battle cry
of "America First." However, the past century has demonstrated that an
isolationist approach by the U.S. toward European security does not promote
stability in Europe. Twice, the outbreak of war in Europe led to U.S. involvement
in major conflicts at great cost and loss of American lives. However, an
internationalist U.S. approach to European security during the Cold War resulted
in nearly a half century of peace - peace in the sense of an absence of major war
- in Europe. This peace in Europe contributed to the security of the United States.
It must be acknowledged, however, that another factor preventing the outbreak of
war in Europe was Soviet Communist repression.
13
Huntington, "America's changing strategic interests," p. 4.
8
Before arguments in favor of the U.S. withdrawing from Europe can be
properly evaluated, it is necessary to look at current U.S. security interests in
Europe.
III. U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS
There are two great tragedies in human existence: one is never to get one's
dearest desire - the other is to get it.
-Oscar Wilde 1892 14
Achieving one's objectives can be a dangerous thing. It requires one to
make the decision of what to do next. The end of the Cold War brought with it an
end to the driving sense of purpose that had influenced American security policy
since the 1940s. The U.S. now faces a time that threatens to bring complacency,
pride, and an abandonment of long-range political and strategic calculation. In
order to not be overcome by this threat, it is necessary for the U.S. to reexamine
its interests in European security in a post-Cold War world. In doing this, the U.S.
would do well to keep Lord Palmerston's statement in mind that, "We have no
eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies." 15
Factors in Europe that could affect the security of the United States include
the future of Russia, the security and stability of Eastern and Western Europe, and
the future of European security institutions.
14Wilde cited in Norman J. Omstein, "Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election,"
Foreign Affairs
, Summer 1992, p. 2.
15Palmerston cited in Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of
the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 194.
10
A. THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA
In the coming years, the greatest potential for instability in the world will
reside in the political, economic, and social fragmentation that is developing in the
vacuum left by the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union. 16 Although the
Soviet Union has ceased to exist, its nuclear weapons remain. It is these
weapons that present the United States with the only serious large-scale direct
threat to its security.
17
Therefore, the primary interest of the United States
regarding Russia is to promote the emergence of a stable, democratic, and
economically sound state. A Russia that is experiencing internal chaos while
maintaining substantial conventional and strategic capabilities will be a loose
nuclear cannon.
The road ahead for Russia is not an easy one. The challenges that lie
ahead include:
Drawing down its nuclear industry and preventing the technology, skills, and
warheads from falling into the wrong hands.
Ensuring that arms control agreements are kept.





Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, Toward a Stable Transition in
Europe: A Conservative/Activist Strategy for the United States , Rand Corporation,
August 1990, p. 5.
11
Converting its massive military industry to productive civilian uses 18
While it is easy to be pessimistic about the future of Russia, successes have
occurred. The Commonwealth states have agreed to place the nuclear arsenal
of the former Soviet Union under unified control. The four Commonwealth states
which contain nuclear forces have declared their intention to implement Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) obligations. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
have expressed their intention to become non-nuclear states. Furthermore,
Russia is reducing its conventional military capabilities. Its military modernization
programs are slowing down and Russia is diverting large amounts of military
spending in an attempt to provide for its military personnel and their families. It
is unlikely that a significant conventional challenge to European security will arise
from Russia for many years to come. Even if a future militaristic Russia had
intentions of this sort, it would be difficult for it to carry out these intentions. "The
projected withdrawal of all forces of the former Soviet Union from East-Central
Europe by 1994 and the independence of Ukraine and Belarus are expected to
complicate fundamentally any hypothetical future planning by Moscow for
aggression in Europe." 19
18
"Securing Europe's Peace." The Economist , February 15, 1992, p. 59.
19
David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992 Draft,
p. 15.
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1 . Prospects for Democracy
These positive developments are being overshadowed by the existence
of dangerous trends within the former Soviet Union. Last year, Soviet GNP
dropped by 15-20 percent. In an effort to address Russia's economic problems,
President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian government are instituting radical
programs of market-oriented reform including price liberalization, privatization of
trade, services, farming, demonopolization, budget deficit reduction, and monetary
reform.
20
Yeltsin and his government are determined to implement these
programs with the understanding that they are the only path to a democratic and
prosperous Russia. However, the reforms are drawing criticism from economists
inside and outside Russia and are sure to cause short term pain for the Russian
people.
While there is a possibility that reform will take hold in Russia and that
Russia will successfully emerge from the Cold War as a democratic state aligned
with Western interests, the stakes are high and the future is uncertain. The
economic situation in Russia will be a key factor in defining the nature of the
future regime in Moscow. History is against Russia in this respect as no one has
ever successfully transformed a command-administrative system into a free
20
Dick Cheney, Statement Before The Senate Armed Services Committee In
Connection With The FY 1993 Budget For The Department Of Defense ,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 31, 1992), p. 9.
13
market economy. 21 If this attempt fails, the U.S. will be faced with new
challenges to its security. A failed attempt at reforms within Russia could lead to
an authoritarian, remilitarized Russia that might attempt to reverse the process of
democracy in Eastern Europe. If an armed conflict were to occur between Russia
and Ukraine or between Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet
Union, it could lead to ecological disasters; large refugee flows to Western
Europe; and a threat to the security of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; as
well as a breakdown in the control of nuclear weapons within Russia and the other
successor states of the Soviet Union. 22
2. Political and Military Implosion
Although the forces of change in Russia bring the potential for the
emergence of a new Western ally, the possibility of a political and military
implosion within the former Soviet Union cannot be excluded. The Soviet Army
is still large and heavily armed. It is the only remaining Soviet institution still
functioning. However, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is an army
without a country. It has no clear mission or chain of command. Its officer corps
is frustrated and discontented. They are frustrated by the waning lack of prestige,






among the military has become: "If the politicians do not decide the fate of the
army, the army will decide the fate of the politicians."23
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney spoke before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in January 1992 of the dangers of a "Weimar Russia."
Cheney discussed the dangers that could result from the failure of Russian efforts
towards democratic and free market policies. An authoritarian leader might
assume power and rearm Russia much as Hitler did with Germany in the 1930s.
The potential for this sort of outcome exists because Russia faces an economic
situation that may not be reparable in time to avoid political, social, and military
implosion, caused by divisions within the military, the existence of reactionary
ideologies and ethnic resentments, along with nostalgia for Russia's lost
empire. 24
B. SECURITY AND STABILITY OF EASTERN EUROPE
The threat of Soviet intervention was a dam placed against pressing waters.





25Adam Przeworski, "The 'East' becomes the 'South'," PSPolitical Science and
Politics (Washington, DC), March 1991, pp. 20-24.
15
The failed Soviet coup of August 1991 was a victory for democratic forces
worldwide. It accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union and helped to oust
Communism from power. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the
reunification of Germany, the world has experienced the most dramatic changes
in international boundaries since the end of World War II. Thus, deterring Soviet
intervention in Eastern Europe is no longer the challenge at hand. Instead, the
challenge is establishing positive relations with the successor states of the Soviet
Union and the East European countries formerly under Soviet control. 26
In determining American interests toward the newly independent states of
Eastern Europe, it should be understood that it is the individual states and not the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which should be the primary focus
of U.S. attention. Regardless of what Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk thinks
about the chances of CIS survival, or Russian President Boris Yeltsin's hope that
the CIS will be more than a formula for "civilized divorce," it is apparent that the
CIS will not become a cohesive successor state to the USSR. The CIS does not
have a government, a constitution, a central bank, or any enforcement mechanism
to implement its decisions. The armed forces of the Commonwealth are in
disarray and some states, including Russia, are moving toward creating their own
military units. In addition, if some post-Soviet states achieve their desire to create
26David S. Yost, May 1992 draft, p. 19.
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their own currency, the CIS will no longer have a common monetary system. 27
Therefore, the U.S. should design its policies toward the individual states of the
former Soviet Union.
U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe should be to promote the emergence of
stable, democratic, and economically sound independent states. These goals are
valid, if for no other reason, than to insure that a neo-imperial Russia will not be
tempted to meddle in Eastern Europe's affairs. 28 However, as in the case of
Russia, the accomplishment of these policy goals will not be easy.
1. Ethnic Conflict Within the Former Soviet Union
Part of the reason for the difficult task which lies ahead for the newly
formed states of Eastern Europe is the line that resembles a geologic fault that
runs from the Caspian to the Adriatic between cultures of Islamic and Christian
origin. This reference to cultural heritage is not meant to imply religious devotion
but to suggest a force that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, will continue to
influence politics and culture in the area it transversed in Eastern Europe, notably
in Southeastern Europe and the Caucasus. 29 This fault line, along with the
relaxation of past Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, has released long-
27
Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," Foreign Affairs ,
Summer 1992, p. 75.
28
lbid., 87.
29John A. Armstrong, "Nationalism in the Former Soviet Empire," Problems of
Communism
. Jan-Apr 1992, p. 121.
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suppressed ethnic tensions. As a result of wars and migrations, there are no
ethnically homogeneous states in Eastern or Central Europe. Before the fall of
communism, these simmering problems of nationalism had not been evident.
Now that communism has been overthrown, the oppressed nations and minorities
are seeking self-determination. 30 The possibility of democracy and free market
economies in this region is therefore being complicated by the increased risk of
conflicts between the new states and civil strife. 31
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the world lost the primary enforcer
of stability in Eastern Europe. The sources of regional violence, which include
nationalism, ethnicity, religion, and economic and social inequality, continued to
exist during the Cold War but were controlled by the "system of accommodating
regional crises within a structure of global stability" provided by the existence of
two functioning superpowers. Now that the Soviet Union has disappeared,
regional conflicts could become more difficult to contain and could produce
dangerous consequences for the international balance of power.32
30
Dr. Geza Jeszenszky, "Nothing quiet on the Eastern front," NATO Review ,
June 1992, p. 7.
31
David S. Yost, May 1992 Draft, p. 17.
32Gaddis, John Lewis, The United States and the End of the Cold War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 204.
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2. Economic Collapse
With the economic collapse of the old Soviet system, the threats to
reformers striving for stable democracies are multiplying daily. Reconstructing
economies that have failed as a result of inherent faults is more difficult than
reconstructing after the devastation of war. 33 The Russian winter could once
again influence history's course as it did in 1812, 1917, and 1941. As the
economy's performance continues to deteriorate, the onset of cold weather could
make the already desperate food, medicine, and energy shortages worse. 34
Undesirable political forces may be waiting for an opportunity to exploit the chaos
and provide a promise of order to an already frustrated and exhausted people. 35
3. Prospects for Democracy
The prospects for democracy in the newly formed states of Eastern
Europe remain uncertain. The best chances for the appearance of stable
democracies lie in the East Central European states of the northern Tier including
former East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. 36 A more difficult
"Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, "America and the Collapse of the
Soviet Empire: What Has to be Done," address at Princeton University,
December 12, 1991, p. 5.
34
lbid.. 12.
35James A. Baker III, "America and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire: What
has to be Done," address at Princeton University, December 12, 1991, cited in
David S. Yost, "The United States and European Security," May 1992 Draft, p. 16.
36John A. Armstrong, p. 125.
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task lies in establishing democracies in the independent countries of Southeastern
Europe. These countries face potentially disruptive border issues and internal
ethnic conflicts. 37 If democracy can mature in the former Soviet Union, there is
a good chance it will become a force of peace in Europe and other critical regions.
However, should any one state alter its democratic course in favor of fascism or
some other authoritarian regime, it could threaten progress towards democracy
in its neighbors. 38
If reform in the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet Republics is
successful, it would provide many advantages to the United States. It would
reduce the U.S. defense needs, the threat of nuclear war, the risk of
disadvantages arms exports, and reduce the risk of environmental disaster. In
addition it would provide economic benefits to the U.S. by opening large new
markets to U.S. exports and promote world economic growth.39
Secretary of State James A. Baker III summarized the position the U.S.
finds itself in towards the former Soviet Union:
Today, after the Cold War, we again stand at history's precipice. If during




Dick Cheney, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President
and the Congress
, p. 14.
39Lee H. Hamilton, "A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs ,
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Western nations and the former Soviet republics stand as awkward climbers
on a steep mountain. Held together by a common rope, a fall toward
fascism or anarchy in the former Soviet Union will pull the West down, too.
Yet equally as important, a strong and steady pull by the West now can help
them to gain their footing so that they, too, can climb above to enduring
democracy and freedom. Surely we must strengthen the rope, not sever
it.
40
When the size of the region, its strategic location, the wealth of its
natural resources, and the fact that it is still home to nearly 30,000 nuclear
weapons and the most powerful conventional forces ever amassed in Europe are
taken into consideration, it is obvious that events there will have a dramatic effect
on the outside world. The United States, the only remaining global superpower,
has a large stake in the outcome. There is no use in imagining a benign new
world order if America has to contend with a post-Soviet civil war or a resurgent
Russian empire. 41
C. SECURITY AND STABILITY OF WESTERN EUROPE
Twice this century, wars on the European continent have involved the United
States. Since the formation of NATO and the establishment of a U.S. military
presence in Europe, major armed conflicts in Europe have been avoided. United
States interests in post-Cold War Europe include the continuation of peaceful and
40
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cooperative relations among the West European countries and continued U.S.
influence in European security affairs.
1. Collective Security
Promotion of the idea of collective security has created a psychological
situation in which the United States cannot turn its back on the concept, not
because of what collective security can accomplish. ..but because of what
millions of people. ..believe it may accomplish in time. Collective security has
come to be the chief symbol of hope that.. .a community of nations will
develop in which there will be no more war.
- Arnold Wolfers42
Proposals for a European collective security system have been
emerging in the post-Cold War security environment of Europe. However, instead
of collective security, advocates of such a system sometimes use the terms
"overarching security system," "pan-European security," "co-operative security,"
or "expanded CSCE."43 While the names differ, the idea goes back to an
ancient concept. In fact, if it were traced back to its roots, credit for the idea
would probably go to Alexandre Dumas whose Three Musketeers first used the
rule "one for all, and all for one."44
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One crucial distinction must be made when discussing the prospects of
a collective security system. The terms "collective defense" and "collective
security" should not be used interchangeably. "Collective defense is another word
for alliance."
45
It implies a relationship where A+B+C are allied against a known
aggressor Z. NATO is an example of such an alliance. On the other hand,
collective security has no predetermined enemies. Theoretically, all members of
the collective security pact would live together in peace until one day one or more
among them disturbed this peace. At this point, all the other members of the
system would unite to thwart this aggression in the form of sanctions, diplomatic
condemnation, and ultimately military action. Its relationship is also A+B+C
against Z. However, it is not known whether Z is actually A,B,or C above; Z might
be one of the very members that has sworn to uphold the peace of the collective
security system. 46
Why is the idea of creating a collective security system gaining political
force? One reason is that the end of the Cold War has brought a marked
decrease in the level of suspicion that exists in international politics. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the United Nations is no longer paralyzed by two
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normal. Collective security is generating interest in itself more by default than
anything else. NATO seems outdated because an alliance without an adversary
seems pointless and "unilateralism seems ineffective or illegitimate."48
According to Richard Betts, enthusiasm for collective security is
encouraged by "confusion about which is the cause and which is the effect in the
relation between collective security and peace, and by conflation of present
security conditions (absence of a threat) with future security functions (coping with
a threat)."
49
This confusion raises questions about whether a collective security
system will actually accomplish what its name implies. Will collective security
function only in conditions where it is not needed? As the security requirements
of its members change, will these changes prevent collective security from
working? Will the possibility of war increase and the ability to cope with threats
become less significant than if a different security system had been used?50
What if collective security works the way it is expected to? By working
according to its design, it will create more military instability instead of less. By
forcing states to become involved when it is not in their best interest, a
commitment to collective security could result in minor wars becoming major ones.
Creating equal military power among states through arms control without
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48






considering their alignment during a potential crisis could create unequal military
forces engaged in a conflict against one another.
A collective security system should not be considered a replacement for
NATO. If a collective security system is used as a replacement for NATO and
doesn't work, the action taken against a rogue country might be weaker than what
could have been undertaken by NATO if it had been maintained. 51 Since a
collective security system is not designed to deter a specific threat, it will not be
a continually functioning system like NATO as many people currently believe. 52
Furthermore, the establishment of a collective security system is reliant upon
states subordinating their own interests to general or remote ones. The ability of
states to perform in this manner has yet to be confirmed by experience. 53
Experience is the only way to prove collective security works since
testing it poses problems. First, there is no way to simulate the function of a
collective security system or perform test runs. Therefore, "trial by fire" is the only
way to see if the system will work. However, if it fails to function properly, the
system's first test could be its last. Furthermore, it would be impossible to know
when a test to the integrity of the system occurred. If there is never a challenge








be proven without knowing if a challenge would have occurred in the absence of
the collective security system.
54
Regardless of its definition or function, the concept of collective security
has failed Europe in the past and it will continue to do so in the future. Several
criticisms exist against the idea of collective security. The main criticism of
collective security is that states fail to live up to the guarantee of united action
against any would-be aggressor. This situation is further aggravated by collective
security taking away the ability of states to act independently of each other. 55
This results in no substantial action being taken against an aggressor state.
Another problem with collective security is that it is often difficult to assign blame
in a conflict in order to decide which state is the aggressor and is to be acted
against. A third problem is stated by Henry Kissinger:
No arrangement would be more likely to create conditions in which one
nation can dominate. For if everybody is allied with everybody, nobody has
a special relationship with anybody. It is the ideal situation for the most
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If Western Europe still requires an organization to guarantee its security,
NATO is the only security structure, existing or planned, that has proven itself
capable of protecting West European security and U.S. interests in Europe.
2. The U.S. Nuclear Guarantee
The U.S. has played a major role in promoting stable relations among
the countries of Western Europe. A significant part of this role has involved the
U.S. nuclear guarantee to European security. It is important that the U.S.
continue to offer a credible security guarantee. Without the U.S. guarantee, "the
weak would once more worry about the strong, and the strong-such as Great
Britain, France, and West Germany-would once more worry about one
another."57
Are nuclear weapons still necessary to insure European security?
Some might argue that nuclear weapons are no longer useful. United States
nuclear weapons were placed in Europe to prevent a hostile Soviet Union from
achieving its expansionistic goals. The purpose in deploying the weapons was
to deter a Soviet threat of blackmail or aggression.
However, just as the situation within Europe and the former Soviet
Union has changed, so have the reasons for providing Europe with a nuclear
guarantee. Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, the potential still exists
for certain political factions to mobilize its remaining conventional and nuclear
57
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forces for their interests. 58 While present trends point to an end to the East-West
military confrontation in Europe, there is still a remote possibility that these
positive trends might be derailed. 59
Even if trends in the former Soviet Union continue on a positive course,
Russia will still be the biggest power in Europe. It will also be bordered by difficult
neighbors to the south and east. For that reason alone it will maintain capable
conventional and nuclear forces. Therefore, Europe will continue to require
nuclear deterrence next to this neighbor. 60
Another difficulty resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union is that
Europe is now home to more nuclear states. Large quantities of conventional and
nuclear weapons are spread throughout the former Soviet Union. There are
roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons, including 2,600 strategic weapons deployed in
Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan. There are also 40,000 metric tonnes of
chemical agents stockpiled in Russia. 61 While it appears that the majority of
these weapons will be destroyed or placed under central control by Moscow,
nothing is certain until this process has been completed.
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Even if the nuclear weapon situation within the former Soviet Union is
under control, the technology to create nuclear weapons cannot be destroyed.
The risk of this technology falling into the wrong hands increases daily. A growing
number of states can now export material, equipment, technology, and services
needed to develop nuclear weapons. Many analysts are afraid these new
suppliers, especially ones that don't adhere to the 1968 Treaty on Non-
Proliferation, will undermine non-proliferation efforts. 62
Supply is not the only side of the nuclear proliferation problem.
Increasing numbers of Third World countries are seeking to meet their nuclear
demands. A number of Middle Eastern and North African states are currently
seeking intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear
program, discovered by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency,
is an excellent example of the nuclear proliferation problem. 63 Furthermore,
recent reports have suggested that certain Middle Eastern countries intend to
recruit former Soviet nuclear scientists to assist them in developing their own
nuclear programs. Robert Gates believes,
The tens of thousands of scientists and engineers associated with
Soviet weapons programs constitute a potentially dangerous "brain
drain" from the former Soviet republics. Only a fraction of these
62
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specialists can actually design nuclear weapons or run a program to
develop and produce biological weapons. But we know from
experience that small numbers of key people count. Most of the
potential emigrants will stay home and work for the betterment of their
homeland, and others would prefer to settle in the West. Some,
however, may be tempted to sell their expertise to Third World
countries trying to acquire or improve special weapons capabilities. 64
Because of the lingering threat of a resurgent hostile force within the
former Soviet Union, the continued existence of large numbers of nuclear
weapons within Russia and its bordering states, and the regional and global
nuclear threat that still exists, U.S. nuclear deterrence capabilities are still
necessary. Furthermore, since the security of Europe affects the security of the
United States, the U.S. has a continued interest in providing this nuclear
guarantee. Therefore, it remains in the interest of the U.S. to prevent non-nuclear
countries of Europe from being coerced by blackmail from Russia or any other
nuclear state. 65
With significantly reduced conventional and nuclear forces, can the U.S.
continue to offer a credible nuclear guarantee to Europe? Some Europeans want
to know how continued nuclear threats to Europe can be prevented when the
64
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United States is withdrawing the majority of its nuclear weapons from the
continent. 66
Granted, a certain level of tangible commitment to Europe is necessary
in order to provide a credible nuclear guarantee. However, it is incorrect to say
the U.S. has reduced or will reduce its forces below this level. Deterrence is not
just a function of numbers of deployed nuclear weapons. Deterrence is also a
function of the enemy's belief that a potential victim will be defended in case of
attack.
67 The United States has interests in European security that go beyond
the presence of American forces on European soil. European instability runs the
risk of becoming American insecurity. The U.S. can no longer isolate itself from
Europe as it has in the past. Therefore, the U.S. should continue to insure
European stability by providing its allies with a credible nuclear guarantee
regardless of current reductions being made to its conventional and nuclear
forces.
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney has argued that a disengagement
of the U.S. from commitments to its European allies might result in destabilization
by encouraging nuclear proliferation. He further stated that, "I would think [that]
if the United States cuts back so much that all we can do and all we can talk










Germany's redefined role in Europe could create a challenge to the
future stability of the European continent. A reunited Germany will grow into a
major economic and military power in the new Europe. Soon the Germans could
ask for the political power they feel their economic and military power entitle them
to.
69 According to Josef Joffe, Germany is "too strong to be left alone, too weak
to go it alone."
If the past hundred years are a guide, Germany has done best when
anchored to a community. Germany-and Europe-have done worst whenever
Germany was left to its own devices or treated as an outcast. 70
Germany is even somewhat apprehensive about its recent unification. The
Economist reports that:
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Curiously, among those who fear Germany the most are the Germans
themselves. With unity, Germany is suddenly bigger, potentially bolder and
drawn to the east as well as to the west. German leaders are anxious to
avoid the follies of the past. They want to bind their country securely into
the community - to create a European Germany, they say, not a German
Europe. Better do the tethering soon, they say darkly; in a few years the
beast will be stronger, wilder, possibly untameable. 71
Being a non-nuclear state, Germany has always viewed nuclear
weapons as political instruments rather than military ones. It has thought in terms
of deterrence rather than nuclear defense. 72 However, it may be wrong to
believe that Germany would never seek to become a nuclear power. If the U.S.
nuclear guarantee was brought into question, Germany might be forced into a
corner on this issue. It is doubtful that Germany would rely on a British or French
guarantee in place of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Furthermore, with Russia and
possibly some of the other successor states retaining nuclear weapons, Germany
will likely see the need for continued nuclear deterrence. The question is whether
this nuclear guarantee will be American or German. 73
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However, for the present, German leaders will likely continue to feel
Germany's political and economic interests are best served by being involved in
some form of alliance structure. Stephen F. Szabo relates that:
In the security area all indications are that future German governments will
continue to see a multinational context as the most conducive to their
interests. German security based on German means alone would result in
more insecurity, both for Germans and their neighbors. German leaders are
likely to continue to recognize that both their security and their broader
political and economic interest are best served through post-national
approaches. 74
Keeping Germany tied with the United States in the post-Cold War
period is very important. Dick Cheney states:
Germany's clearly one of the major power houses in the world. Maintaining
that close relationship between [Germany and] the United States - from a
security standpoint, but also in terms of our economic and political ties - I
think is very important.. .the future, in terms of stability in Europe, depends
very much on that relationship. 75
Bad memories of a militaristic Germany linger in the minds of many Europeans.
"Not only in Europe but also around the world, enduring memories of World War
II still limit Germany's ability to play a role commensurate with its economic power
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and geopolitical importance." 76 Many Europeans view NATO and the EC as a
means of providing reassurance that Germany will not see any need to develop
"an autonomous security policy or perceive any need to seek military power
commensurate with its economic strength."77 This European view includes
preventing Germany from feeling the need to develop its own nuclear deterrent
force.
78
American views of the German question are different from those among
some Europeans. "Unlike some of its European allies, the United States has had
no significant reservations in championing German unity and national self-
determination over the decades, though the United States has naturally been
interested in encouraging the united Germany to remain fully committed to the
Atlantic Alliance."
79 Some U.S. observers judge that strong ties with Germany
will "promote European-American cooperation in meeting the political, economic,
and security challenges of the future."80 Indeed, according to Lieutenant General
William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.),
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Throughout this century, when U.S. security policy has been rooted firmly in
Germany, there has been peace in Europe. When it has been rooted in
London, or London and Paris, there has been war. 81
D. EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS
The security of Europe in the post-Cold War world will, it is hoped, be
assured by a broad range of organizations that bring parties in Europe together
to further order and stability. The organizations currently pursuing this goal
include NATO (complemented by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council), WEU,
CSCE, and the EC.
1. NATO
NATO has been and will continue to be the primary pillar for European
security.
82 NATO has helped to create a feeling of security in the minds of many
Europeans largely due to the fact that it has been the principal link between North
America and Europe.83 Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to
preserve the Atlantic Alliance and to continue to support U.S. commitments to
European security. Regardless of the changes that have occurred in Europe
recently, the U.S. role as an outside balancer and protector of European security
will continue to be important in the years to come.
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However, NATO's role will obviously change during the 1990's. Due to
the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the decline in Moscow's power, the
degree of U.S. influence in certain alliance decisions may be reduced. 84
Furthermore, with calls being heard for a reduction in the U.S. military presence
in Europe and a greater emphasis on domestic needs at home, the United States
is likely to emphasize that a greater share of the financial burden for defending
shared European security interests be assumed by its allies. 85 In April 1991,
President Bush said,
Whether it's the European Community, or a broadened mandate for the
CSCE, the U.S. supports all efforts to forge a European approach to
common challenges on the Continent and in the world beyond, with the
understanding that Europe's reciprocal, more mature security relationships
will be more sustainable over time. We will expect our allies to share with
us the burden of leadership. 86
While U.S. officials see increased roles for the EC, WEU, and CSCE in
the coming years, they do not feel that these roles should be pursued at the
expense of NATO's traditional missions. In February 1991 , William H. Taft IV, the
U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, said, "We support a
84
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European pillar, but one that does not duplicate the Alliance, one that operates
within the Alliance to do Alliance tasks and outside the Alliance only where it
wishes to take on new missions."87 The overall U.S. policy on the establishment
of European security institutions can be summed up by Secretary of Defense, Dick
Cheney,
...it should be done in a way that doesn't undermine or weaken NATO. I find
that position is generally supported by all of our European allies and most
especially by the nations of Eastern Europe. 88
2. The European Community
The U.S. welcomes the efforts by the European Community to establish
a unified Europe. It also favorably views European efforts to make the WEU
NATO's European pillar and the defense component of the EC. President Bush
applauded efforts toward European unity at the Maastricht Summit in December
1991 when he said,
The United States has long supported European unity because of our strong
conviction that it was good for Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, and
87
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good for the worlcL.A more united Europe offers the United States a more
effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities. 89
At the same time the President reaffirmed the fact that "NATO will remain the
essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement
on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the Allies under
the Washington Treaty."90
However, it appears that the EC may be in turbulent waters. Efforts by
the EC to establish a single currency and to adopt common foreign and security
policies have run into problems after a Danish referendum resulted in a 'no' vote
in June 1992. The French only narrowly approved the treaty in September 1992.
While the U.S. favors a united Europe and the advantages it could offer to the
Atlantic Alliance, it may have a while yet to wait.
3. CSCE
Initial U.S. assessments did not view the CSCE as having an important
role in the new Europe. However, the U.S. has recently been placing an
increased emphasis on the security functions of the CSCE. 91 Originally, it was
feared that an all-European security arrangement could threaten NATO. However,
"President Bush, December 1991, cited in David S. Yost, "The United States
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it is hoped that the CSCE will be able to help promote democracy, economic
liberalization, and a peaceful transition in Eastern Europe. 92 The U.S.
government has realized that membership in NATO for Russia and other
successor states of the USSR is not politically practical any time soon and
therefore sees the desirability of utilizing the CSCE as a diplomatic framework. 93
Furthermore, the U.S. holds that the CSCE should be developed to ease ethnic
and national tensions and to resolve conflicts in Eastern Europe. The U.S. wants
to find ways to strengthen the CSCE's crisis management and conflict prevention
capabilities.
94
While the U.S. supports European efforts to establish a European
defense identity, it is apparent that NATO's role of guaranteeing the defense of
Western Europe is secure for the time being. Neither the EC or the CSCE is a
likely vehicle for a European defense structure. The Gulf war was a reminder that
close integration with a powerful ally has its benefits. NATO, during this period
of rapid transition in Europe, has been a reassuring comfort to those involved just
by being there.95
However, for NATO to weather the coming years, certain problems will
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Will NATO expand to the East and allow the newly formed independent
states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia, to join the alliance?
Will NATO become further involved in peace-keeping missions in Eastern
Europe to help contain and resolve disputes among the nationalities in that
region?
Since many future threats to European security will include multi-faceted,
multi-directional threats to allied security from Eastern European instability,
nuclear proliferation, and aggressors to Europe's south, how will NATO
resolve the out-of-area question?96
It would be foolish to think that military threats to Europe have
disappeared. However, it is harder to identify them. The front line in Central
Europe is gone. By 1995 there could be fewer than 100,000 American troops on
European soil. 97 In this time of uncertainty, there are few threats imaginable that
Europeans could meet as effectively without America's military help and logistical
support. However, this should not dissuade Europeans from organizing their own
defense contributions. These contributions could encourage the United States to
remain involved and continue to hold up its end of the alliance at a time when
financial costs are becoming increasingly important.
The distinction must be drawn, however, when these contributions start
competing with NATO instead of complementing it. NATO's commitment to
European freedom has been the foundation that European prosperity and stability
have been built upon. The U.S. military presence has given West Europeans the
96
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reassurance and security they needed in order to calm their past rivalries. In this
respect, NATO has not only been advantageous for the peace and stability of
Europe, but, in light of the fact that European instabilities have involved the U.S.
in undesirable situations in the past (notably World War I and World War II), it has
been a source of peace and stability for the United States.98
E. A PLACE AT THE EUROPEAN TABLE
The U.S. will have a continued interest in the wide variety of political and
economic decisions that will be made in the post-Cold War Europe. Just as the
speed with which the Soviet Union collapsed came as a surprise, events in
Europe and the world continue to move quickly. There are a wide variety of
possible events that could occur in which the United States will have a vested
interest.
The U.S. is tied to Europe. If these bonds are loosening in the military
realm, they are ever tightening in the economic realm. The European economies
are headed toward integration. This integration will add to the productive
capability of Europe. European stability will benefit the European economy. U.S.
pocketbooks are tied to Europe's pocketbooks. Therefore, what benefits the
European economy will benefit the American economy. On the other hand,
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instability in Europe would hurt its economic performance. This instability would
flow across the Atlantic and run the danger of becoming American instability."
Currently, the U.S. commitment to NATO and the U.S. military forces
deployed in Europe give the United States a voice in European security matters.
By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. military presence in Europe may be much less
than what it is currently. Therefore, in a Europe that may act with greater
cohesion than it has in the past, the U.S. may be forced to accept a reduced role
in defining the course of events. It is nonetheless important that the U.S.
continues to influence the course of events in Europe. The U.S. should strive to
maintain a place at the European table in order to maintain a voice in European
affairs that affect U.S. security and stability. 100
Although the Cold War is over, the U.S. continues to have interests in
European security affairs. It is crucial that these interests be adequately defined
if the United States is to successfully pursue a national security strategy for a
post-Cold War world.
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IV. ANALYZING KEY ISSUES
Since Washington delivered his farewell address, modern technology has
made the world many times smaller. Strategic missiles and bombers are capable
of striking targets deep within the heart of any continent. It is no longer possible
for the United States to isolate itself from the rest of the world.
Some Americans nonetheless favor making larger reductions to the U.S.
military presence in Europe and in the size of the defense budget than what the
Bush Administration's Base Force plan called for. They believe further reductions
are possible since the Soviet Union has collapsed and that any future threats to
U.S. interests on the European continent appear to exist only in speculative and
"what-if" scenarios. They also believe that, by spending less on defense, greater
progress can be made in deficit reduction and in the U.S. economic situation.
It should be noted that there is a broad spectrum of opinion on how large
cuts in defense spending and reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe
should be. Some extremes exist. But the views of most members of Congress
can be found somewhere in the middle. This middle is dominated by the belief
that reductions should be made in the defense budget and in the U.S. military
presence in Europe beyond what President Bush's Base Force Plan called for.
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However, in light of the current economic situation, it is also generally conceded,
these reductions should be instituted at a responsible rate.
The desire for larger cuts in defense spending is not restricted to one party.
Members of both the Democratic and Republican parties are calling for further
reductions. Furthermore, with the exception of Congressmen Aspin, Kennedy,
Glenn, and a handful of others, few in Congress have suggested specific numbers
regarding what the U.S. military presence in Europe or the defense budget should
be reduced to.
The purpose of this section will be to examine the central issues being raised
to support further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe and the
defense budget. Every attempt will be made to avoid a "straw man" approach in
raising and examining the issues presented below.
A. DOES EUROPE STILL NEED A U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE?
This view is supported by reference to changed circumstances. If the Soviets
no longer pose a threat, to what extent should the United States continue to
guarantee the security of NATO Europe? Forces of the Former Soviet Union
(FSU) are withdrawing from East European bases. With them they are taking a
large part of the threat that has faced Western Europe since 1945. Once these
former Soviet military forces have left, it is unlikely that they will return any time
soon. The economy of the FSU is weak. Politically, the FSU is in danger of
swinging between civil strife and the reestablishment of strong central control by
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an authoritarian leadership. It is unlikely that in its weakened condition the FSU
could support a military machine powerful enough to invade Eastern Europe or to
threaten Western Europe at any time in the near future. 101 While he doesn't
advocate a complete withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee to Europe, Senator
James R. Sasser believes greater reductions to U.S. troop levels in Europe can
be made. Furthermore, he believes it is time for U.S. allies to begin paying their
fair share of the European defense burden. Senator Sasser states,
I am tired of seeing our hard-earned tax dollars go to other places. I am
weary of seeing over $100 billion a year go to maintain a military
establishment in Europe which, when I last looked, amounted to 280,000
U.S. troops, supported by tens of thousands of civilian employees. Why
should they still be there defending Western Europe? The threat is gone. We
ought to be talking about bringing them home in great quantities and
investing the money the we spend in Europe here on our own people. The
American people have borne the burden for half a century. We spend more
of our gross national product year in and year out, twice as much as any
other country in the free world, for a military to provide a shield for Germany,
for Japan -- and we were glad to do that during the long, dark days of the
Cold War. But the Cold War is over now. We bore the burden. We paid the
price. We won. 102
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Senator Tom Harkin believes that larger cuts in defense spending should be made
now that the Cold War is over. He also believes that continued military spending
at Cold War levels will do little to battle the new threats that exist. He states,
For the last 40 years, two generations of American gave their blood, their
lives and spent $12 trillion to fight the Cold War and defend the world from
communism. But now the Cold War is over. And we won. Europe and
Japan are rebuilt. We helped rebuild them. The Soviet Union is dead. We
helped kill it. The Cold War is over, and continuing military spending at Cold
War levels is senseless. Certainly military threats still exist, but now they are
more likely to come from terrorist states, drug traffickers and ... the spread
of nuclear weapons. And the massive military forces built up over the past
four decades cannot help us solve the crises of the next decade. ..Aside from
the President and some aggressive Pentagon planners, most Americans
recognize that the United States has no major military rivals, and by all
accounts it would take more than a decade for one to arise. 103
The above views have a foundation in the new realities. The immediate
threat from the East is considered by most to be practically non-existent.
Furthermore, Senator Harkin is correct in pointing out that future threats to
European security stand a good chance of coming from terrorist states, drug
traffickers, and the spread of nuclear weapons. However, the current European
security situation should be further evaluated before the belief that Europe no
longer faces a significant security threat is accepted as a basis for further
reductions in the U.S. military presence in Europe.
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The former Soviet Union is in a state of political, military, and economic
upheaval. Even in its weakened condition, however, the strategic military
capability of Russia remains a concern of Europe and the United States.
Secretary of Defense Cheney wrote in February 1992, "There is no country
capable of mounting a global military challenge to our security except with respect
to strategic nuclear forces." 104 Secretary of State Baker expressed further
concern about the residual strategic capability of Russia. In December 1991 Baker
stated,
Economically, the old Soviet system has collapsed, multiplying every day the
threats these reformer face-from social dislocation to political fragmentation
to ethnic violence. ..Politically, the dangers of protracted anarchy and chaos
are obvious. Great empires rarely go quietly into extinction. No one can
dismiss the possibility that darker political forces lurk in the wings,
representing the remnants of Stalinism or the birth of nationalist extremism
or even fascism, ready to exploit the frustrations of a proud but exhausted
people in their hour of despair. Strategically, both these alternatives-anarchy
or reaction-could become threats to the West's vital interests when they
shake a land that is still home to nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons and the
most powerful arsenal of conventional weaponry ever amassed in
Europe. 105
As the Baker statement suggests, building peace and stability within Russia
and the other successor states will take time. These areas are caught up in
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ancient cultural and religious conflicts. While the disintegration of the Soviet Union
has allowed the potential for free democratic states to form within the FSU, this
disintegration has also allowed rivalries, which had previously been suppressed by
the power of the Soviet Union, to resurface.
European leaders are aware that they cannot accurately predict the future of
Russia and the other successor states. It is uncertain what form the future
governments of Russia and the other successor states will take. Therefore, it is
impossible to state with certainty that no future threat to Western Europe will arise
in Russia and/or other former Soviet states. The dismal economic conditions in
the FSU could disrupt the efforts of democratic forces. It is still possible that a
nationalistic, militarized regime could gain control of Russia and other successor
states. The possibility of a "Weimar Russia" that might seek to regain control of
its former empire still exists. 106 With the chaos that exists within Russia and the
other successor states of the former Soviet Union, an authoritarian regime might
be welcomed as the restorer of order in a troubled society. Such a regime would
most likely be anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-foreigner, and have massive
military and particularly nuclear forces available to it. 107
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The United States must realize that even many Russian "democrats" are not
completely convinced about the value of Western principles of democracy. Many
in Russia would be happy to part with democracy in exchange for food and other
basic necessities. 108 Part of the intelligentsia in Russia, which opposed
Communism, is motivated more by nationalistic concerns than by democracy. 109
Some members of the intelligentsia are coming to realize that democracy will be
no more to their liking than Communism was. The ideas of democracy and
capitalism are new, even to the Russians that support them. Furthermore, these
ideas go against the values that form the core of Russian national consciousness.
The intelligentsia have always believed that they constitute a natural social elite.
It is possible that relatively few people today in Russia want Western-style
democracy. The masses cry for food. The cultural elites want status. Many see
democracy robbing them of these desires. 110 While the 1990s may be a period
of hope and promise for the emergence of stable democratic institutions in the
FSU, for now there are no assurances. Until the situation in the FSU stabilizes,
any action by the United States to drastically change its military commitment to
NATO Europe may lead to regret. While Russian capabilities in the years to come
remain uncertain, the U.S. must be prepared to face a formidable opponent.
108
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Other issues draw the future security of Europe into question. For instance,
who is in control of the nuclear weapons within the other successor states of the
Soviet Union? According to William C. Potter, Director of the Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, other
Soviet successor states may also become autonomous nuclear powers, despite
the May 1992 signing of the Lisbon protocol. Two key states where this possibility
exists are Armenia and Ukraine. According to Potter, either of these states
seeking to develop its own nuclear capability would hold ramifications for the
START Treaty. Russia will most likely ratify START. However, Russia could
refuse to implement START if the above situation occurs. Potter believes that
Ukraine already has negative control over the nuclear weapons on its territory.
This is because Ukraine pays the salaries of the crews manning the missiles.
Furthermore, Ukraine is seeking to gain positive control by developing its own
codes for arming and targeting the missiles. 111
Security threats to Western Europe still exist. Therefore, it is necessary that
the United States maintain a significant commitment to European security. As
Richard K. Betts states:
It is especially reckless at the moment to invest confidence in any particular
estimate of why, how, and when things will go wrong. Major discontinuities
in international relations are seldom predicted. Who would not have been
111,
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derided and dismissed in 1988 for predicting that within a mere three years
Easter Europe would be liberated, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
deposed, and the Union itself on the ash heap of history? Yet it is hard to
believe that the probability of equally revolutionary negative developments,
of economic crisis and ideological disillusionment with democracy, of
scapegoating and instability leading to miscalculation, escalation, and war
several years from now is lower than the probability of the current peace
seemed several years ago. 112
Perhaps Winston Churchill summed it up best when prior to World War I he
said,
[War] is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the twentieth century. ..No
one would do such things. Civilization has climbed above such perils. The
interdependence of nations, ...the sense of public law,.. .liberal
principles, ...Christian charity,. ..[and] common sense have rendered such
nightmares impossible. However, adding rhetorically, Churchill asked: Are
you quite sure? It would be a pity to be wrong. 113
B. DOES THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE "COST" THE U.S. TOO MUCH?
This issue may be summarized as follows:
Why should the United States be required to guarantee the security of Western
Europe? Hasn't Europe changed? Can't it provide more for its own security?
Shouldn't the United States stop bearing an unfair level of the Western European
defense burden?
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Representative Lee H. Hamilton believes the U.S. should make Europe pay
more of the cost of its defense. Lee H. Hamilton states,
The United States also continues to bear a disproportionate share of
common defense burdens. There is no longer any reason why the United
States should devote a larger portion of its GDP to defense spending than
its wealthy European and Asian allies. These countries are capable of
paying more for their own defense and supplying their own troops to replace
U.S. forces.
114
Before the U.S. asks its European allies to pay their "fair share" for the
security guarantee to Europe, the U.S. should evaluate the benefits its current
commitment to the Atlantic Alliance provides. Furthermore, by what amount can
the U.S. reduce its military presence in Europe before these benefits are lost?
Countering the Soviet threat was the main reason the U.S. maintained an
influential military presence in Europe after World War II. Just as Europe has
evolved over the past 40 years, so have U.S. reasons for maintaining forces and
commitments on the continent. Since the late 1940s, the reasons U.S. military
forces have been on European soil have evolved into implicit ones that are not
closely related to the possibility of Soviet aggression advanced in official
statements. The U.S. military presence has played two important roles separate
from deterrence of the Soviet Union. A U.S. military presence in Europe serves
as a general contribution to European security and gives America a place at the
114Lee H. Hamilton, p. 51.
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European economic and political table. As the threat from the Soviet Union has
declined, these two reasons have begun to dominate. 115
America has played a pacifying role to Western Europe. The U.S. role as a
guarantor of European stability has been underscored by NATO officials and
parliamentarians. Canadian diplomat Jeremy K.B. Kinsman said, "There is a
mystique to American arms that acts as a sedative in political crisis." 116 The
U.S. removed the cause of conflict in previous wars by removing the necessity for
autonomous choice in matters of defense. 117
Until the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, the search for security by Western
European countries was often a catalyst for insecurity. Each country's search
posed a threat to the others. "Because there is no ultimate guardian, states must
assume the worst; because they act in terms of their worst assumptions, they
excite the worst suspicions of their neighbors and rivals, whose countervailing
responses merely serve to buttress the former countries' initial anxiety." 118 The
United States defused the ancient rivalries that led to past wars. The Soviet threat
didn't extinguish these rivalries. It only overshadowed them.
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The U.S. at considerable cost has built an international order in Western
Europe that has been stable, preserved the security and independence of its
members, and has muted the use of force. 119 While wars have battered the rest
of the world for the past 40 years, Western Europe has remained largely at peace.
The great realization by Western leaders after two world wars has been that,
unless America remains engaged with Europe in order to preserve stability, the
U.S. might be required to restore equilibrium at a later date. This is no less true
today than it was during the Cold War. According to Henry Kissinger, Germany
has become so strong that by themselves other European countries cannot
balance its power. Without the United States, Britain and France would lack the
power to provide balance to Western Europe, and Germany would lack an anchor
to keep nationalistic tensions and outside pressures in check. 120 The only
reason France accepted German membership in NATO after World War II was
because the U.S. and Britain guaranteed France against the dread consequences
of Germany's resurgence. 121 Once again, Germany has the potential ability to
dominate Europe. Is the U.S. ready to accept the resurfacing of apprehensions
among Europeans which have led to previous wars in Europe? As Joffe writes,
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"By extending its guarantee, the United States removed the prime structural cause
of conflict among states--the search for an autonomous defense policy." 122
The U.S. must maintain an influential military presence in NATO Europe
because its stake in Europe is most strongly represented by this presence. 123
This involvement gives the United States influence in European matters which are
central to its national interest.
By maintaining an influential role in NATO the United States has access to
the European economic and political table. The process of integration in the
European Community is continuing. A more united Europe holds advantages and
disadvantages for the United States. By uniting, Europe may allow the U.S. to
reduce its military presence on the continent. European unity may also give the
U.S. a stronger partner to work with in addressing various regional problems
around the world.
However, some U.S. observers judge that the European Community, which
will have a larger GNP than the U.S., is becoming a "fortress Europe." Richard
Nixon states,
The closer post-1992 Europe comes, the more protectionist the European
Community becomes. European companies received an average of $115
billion a year in state subsidies during the 1980s, a practice that shows no
signs of abating. Today, the annual subsidy for state-owned steel companies
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is $225 million. If a ship is built with subsidized steel, the builder can get an
additional 13 percent in shipbuilding subsidies from the community. Airbus,
the European aerospace consortium, receives an estimated $20 billion in
subsidies, while Air France raked in $400 million and the Belgian airline
Sabena requested $1 billion. Unless the European Community states to
open its domestic markets, it is inevitable that the rest of the world will close
theirs.
124
Evidence of discrimination against the United States by the European Community
has been apparent from the beginning. According to Henry Kissinger,
Exterior barriers of a common market are by definition higher than its internal
ones. During the postwar period the shared security concern caused these
competing interests to take a back seat. 125
Richard Nixon argues that the U.S. role in NATO gives it a voice in European
affairs:
The U.S. role in NATO gives us significant indirect leverage in addressing
such issues as the Persian Gulf crisis and trade disputes. Without a military
presence, we would have no voice in Europe. 126
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A final response to the argument that NATO offers little benefit to the United
States can be found in the old saying, "a miser pays twice." 127 In other words,
it costs less to maintain an adequate U.S. military presence in Europe in order to
help insure peace on the continent than it would for the U.S. to rebuild its presence
there if a future crisis were to arise. It is inevitable, given the manner in which the
U.S. and other Western cultures are intermingled, that any future conflict in
Western Europe would once again imply a U.S. military role. Furthermore, the
interdependence of European economies, monetary systems, and financial
markets, would mean that the economic cost to the U.S. of a future conflict could
be quite large. 128
The Atlantic Alliance is the only international organization with the military
command structure capable of adapting to a variety of situations both in Europe
and abroad. Europeans trust the alliance and understand the need to keep the
U.S. influential in NATO in order to insure European stability. 129 However, the
U.S. military presence in Europe and involvement in NATO is a two-way street.
It provides the United States with the ability to take part in European matters that
affect U.S. national interests. NATO also provides the U.S. with a place at the
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European economic and political table. This place will take on increasing
importance as European unity looms closer on the horizon. Before further
reductions are made to its military presence in Europe, the U.S. should evaluate
how these reductions will affect its influence in Europe.
C. CAN THE U.S. BE PAID A "PEACE DIVIDEND"?
This issue can be summarized as follows:
The U.S. must be strong economically. In the future, national security will be
determined by economic strength more than military might. It is important that the
U.S. rebuild its economy and world competitiveness.
According to Representative Lee H. Hamilton,
U.S. economic performance is troubling. Economics can no longer take
second place to national security in setting U.S. government policy. 130
The level of defense spending the U.S. maintained during the Cold War
significantly added to the budget deficit. Senator Robert Byrd states,
We have to take a hard look at the defense budget because resources are
scarce, the economy is in trouble, and we are losing in the international
economic Olympics. Fortunately for us, our long-time major world adversary
has collapsed. We have been given a reprieve.... It is a sobering thing to
contemplate how much we have become like our former adversary. The
Soviet Union became a mighty military giant that siphoned all of its
130
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resources. It could not deal with change. It could not compete economically.
It collapsed because of a huge inflexible military bureaucracy that, in the end,
was not sustainable economically. We are headed down the same road. 131
Senate Budget Committee Chairman Jim Sasser feels that Bush's defense budget
cuts are "token at best." They would only translate into approximately a $4 billion
reduction in spending in 1993. "Now I ask you, where's the peace dividend in that
defense cut?" He also feels that failing to reduce defense spending more than is
currently being called for over the next 5 years will hurt very desperately needed
investment in the U.S. 132
Many in Congress support diverting the money saved from cuts in defense
spending into the domestic economy. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell
desires to cut defense to provide increased support for domestic programs. "We
have an education system that isn't teaching, a health care system that isn't taking
care of people, an infrastructure system that isn't permitting efficient transportation,
and an unemployment insurance system that doesn't provide insurance to the
unemployed." 133 According to Senator Paul David Wellstone,
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The redefinition of national security is not yet more bombs and missiles. It
is not close to a $300 billion military budget, albeit we have to have a strong
defense. The redefinition of national security is the security of our local
communities where people have jobs they can count on, jobs at decent
wages with decent fringe benefits, where there is housing and people are not
homeless, where there is a commitment one more time to an education
second to none." 134
These views are rooted in new political and economic realities. The U.S.
economic situation is troubling. The fact that economics is increasing in
importance as military strength declines in importance further emphasizes the need
to improve the U.S. economy in order to maintain the national security of the U.S.
The United States faces additional domestic problems which will have to be
addressed in the coming years. It is obvious that the U.S. should improve its
infrastructure, reduce unemployment, help the homeless, and improve its education
system. The question is whether cuts in defense spending would necessarily have
a significant effect on the U.S. domestic situation and any of the problems cited
above. The support for a peace dividend to be gained by cuts in defense
spending appears to be valid. Surely by cutting defense spending and diverting
the savings into the economy, it is argued, the U.S. domestic situation would
improve.
Further examination of this issue is necessary, however. The first problem
with this reasoning is that cuts in defense spending won't produce any real savings
134
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for some time. Rep. Jon Kyi claims that those who expect huge savings from
defense are mistaken. It takes money to close down military bases and to
dismantle nuclear warheads. 135 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) echoes
Kyi's opinion when it states that destroying nuclear warheads will only save $5
billion dollars between 1992 and 1997. It adds that the significant savings will not
start until the year 2001. 136
Another problem with the peace dividend logic is that currently the defense
budget is only 18% of the federal budget. While even steps towards deficit
reduction will help, even the largest of the proposed defense cuts would have only
a minimal effect. Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, states, "We should get rid of the notion floating around that by cutting
defense we can get our national debt under control." 137 Admiral David Jeremiah,
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns that even if the defense budget
were cut in half, to 9% of the federal budget, the nation's budget problems cannot
be resolved without trimming other federal programs. Adm. Jeremiah also warns
that cutting defense too much will result in the U.S. no longer having the high-
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technology force that enabled the U.S. to perform so well in the Persian Gulf. 138
Senators John W. Warner and Sam Nunn hold that many congressmen are looking
for the defense budget to solve the nation's economic problems without
considering what the cuts would do to national defense. 139
Indeed, some proponents of the "peace dividend" argument may not
understand what effect large cuts in defense spending would have on the
American economy. Aides to Senate Democratic leaders report that lawmakers
are finding it difficult to agree on how large defense cuts should be. This is not
easy because cuts in defense spending will hurt local economies. Due to the
detrimental effect President Bush's cuts have had on the defense industry and the
poor state of the economy, Congress is hesitant to make further cuts in the
defense budget. 140 Sam Nunn calls estimates that even under Bush's proposal
2 million military and civilian workers will lose their jobs, "very sobering." Ranking
House Budget Committee Republican Bill Gradison has said that some in
Congress were already in a "state of shock" over what the proposed cuts in
defense spending would do to their districts. 141 Gordon Adams, director of the
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Defense Budget Project, feels that Congress is between a "rock and a hard place."
Members of Congress want a peace dividend but they don't want it to hurt their
districts.
142
It is obvious that cuts in defense spending will not solve the nation's
economic problems. Even if the savings gained from reducing the defense budget
were applied to purposes other than deficit reduction, it would not be a significant
amount for many years. Furthermore, the short-term effects of defense cuts are
likely to do more harm than good to local economies. Upon closer inspection, the
"peace dividend" appears to be more of a "pipe dream."
The U.S. may already have received its "peace dividend." However, this
dividend may be difficult to measure in dollars. The U.S. military presence in
Europe has provided almost a half century of peace on a continent that in previous
years was battered by war. As previously mentioned, this peace has brought
security and prosperity to the U.S. Furthermore, the level of defense spending the
U.S. pursued during the Cold War allowed it to create a military force second to
none. As long as this force is not destroyed in pursuit of savings that may not
exist, the U.S. military will continue to provide security for the U.S. in the coming
years. This security will provide the United States with the ability to further prosper





D. DOES EUROPE WANT A U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE?
Given the confusion in the U.S. about the level of military presence it should
maintain in Europe, maybe the U.S. should ask Europe if it wants U.S. forces
there. European voices of opposition to a U.S. military presence in Europe are
calling for the U.S. to remove its troops. Josef Joffe has referred to "the more
extreme voices of the European peace movement, whose deepest dreams dovetail
nicely with the retractionist ambitions of the American critics: If Europe could only
push back the superpowers, the entire continent would live in tranquility ever after." 143
As both sides of the Atlantic evaluate their new security needs now that the
Cold War is over, European public opinion will play an important role. Therefore,
it is important to evaluate West European public opinion as it relates to the United
States and its role in the post-Cold War world.
In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to ask several questions. How
much anti-American sentiment exists among Europeans? Has the diminished
threat to Europe resulted in an increase in anti-Americanism? How do Europeans
view the continued presence of American forces?
As the 1990s begin, the overall European attitude towards the United States
remains favorable. In most European countries, anti-American attitudes are only
held by a small percentage of people. 144
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Throughout the 1980s anti-Americanism was the view of only a limited
minority in most West European countries, with only 15 to 25% holding anti-
American/unfavorable/bad attitudes of the United States. The level of anti-
American feelings was higher than this only in Britain, Greece, Spain, and
Turkey. More-over, pro-American/favorable/good feelings were consistently
the pre-dominant view during the 1980s except in Greece and Spain. 145
The majority of Europeans feel the U.S. should not withdraw from its security
arrangements with Europe. Furthermore, Europeans want a continued U.S.
military presence on their continent. 146 More than half of all Europeans in
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy indicated in May 1991 that, with regard to
security matters, their countries' interests were similar to those of the United
States. Only Spain considered these interests to be dissimilar. 147
West European leaders have also emphasized the need for a continued U.S.
military presence in a strong security alliance with Europe. In fact, West
Europeans believe that the continuation of U.S. involvement in European security
matters is important and that NATO is essential to their security interests. They
are in favor of the continued presence of U.S. troops on European soil.
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presence is that Europeans remain influenced by several fears. These fears
include the fear of war, fear of Germany, and fear of change.
Fear of nuclear and conventional war has been a primary purpose for
Europeans wanting an American military presence on their continent for the past
40 years. "The U.S. nuclear commitment to Europe is a key element in U.S. and
European security, and the presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe has long
been regarded as needed to make that commitment manifest." 149 Therefore, if
the U.S. withdraws from Europe, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee would
be brought into question. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the threat of an
East-West nuclear war in Europe has decreased considerably. However, even
with a greatly reduced threat of nuclear war from the FSU, the presence of an
American nuclear guarantee has helped insure that other European countries such
as "Germany, Italy, or Czechoslovakia" will not seek to become nuclear
powers. 150
Significant numbers of Europeans also share a fear of Germany. They do
not fear a renewal of military aggression or Nazism, but rather the economic and
political powerhouse that a reunified Germany might develop into. The U.S.
military presence in Germany and Europe provides a balance to the economic,
political, and military power of Germany, with politically important psychological
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effects. The presence of American troops in Europe provides a symbol of
participation from "a nation with more than three times the population and GNP of
even a reunified Germany." 151 NATO's contribution to European security
remains indispensable. NATO relates America to Europe and Germany to
America. The American military presence reassures Europeans about Germany's
future, because Germany has incentives to be a reliable ally in NATO. 152
All these fears can be summed up as the fear of change. The American
military presence in Europe has promoted freedom, prosperity, and economic and
political integration. The fear of change could bring about the renewal of old
rivalries and suspicions. This could increase European instability, which is not in
the interests of the United States. Helmut Kohl stated in June 1992 that,
We Germans, we Europeans, want to further expand the transatlantic
partnership. Europe still needs America - and I would add, America needs
Europe. ..Ladies and gentlemen, America's and Canada's role in and
responsibility for Europe are of vital importance for peace and security on our
continent - and particularly for united Germany at its core. The indispensable
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V. OVERALL VIEWS FROM WASHINGTON
Versions of the above views can be found in all corners of the United States.
However, the debate has been especially heated in Washington. The next
Administration will face the challenge of defining "a vision for the United States and
the role it will play in a dramatically changed world." 154 The Clinton
Administration will have to make it clear that the U.S. is facing a moment in history
where domestic and foreign policy are inseparable. Former U.S. Ambassador to
China, Winston Lord, said on the changing American role, "foreign policy begins
at home and requires a strong America; that a strong America, in turn, depends
on creative leadership abroad." 155
Will President Clinton make significant changes to the Bush Administration's
defense drawdown plans? How is the U.S. military being restructured to face the
challenges that lie ahead? How large will the U.S. defense budget be in the
coming years? What will the composition of U.S. military forces be?
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A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS PLAN
"These cuts are deep," President Bush announced in his 1992 State of the
Union address. "You must know my resolve, this deep and no deeper." 156
Bush's plan for military reductions is designed to reduce the U.S. defense budget
without reducing the quality of the United States military. In the past, after winning
major wars, the U.S. dismantled its military forces with disastrous results. 157
On October 6, 1992, President Bush signed the $254 billion fiscal year 1993
defense appropriations bill. This bill will increase the speed with which reductions
are made in the U.S. defense budget. While hardware programs bear the brunt
of the reduction, the bill cuts operating costs and weapons procurement programs
as well. Although the Pentagon's purchasing power has decreased for several
years, 1992 will mark the first sharply significant reduction in absolute terms in
defense spending since the mid-1970s. 158 As a percentage of GNP, the defense
budget is dropping from a peak of 6.3 percent during the Reagan buildup to 3.4
percent by 1997. Bush's plan makes large reductions and cancellations to
156Bush cited in Rick Maze, "Congress: Cut More." Army Times , February 10,
1992, p. 14.
157
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programs and modifications through 1997 rather than making large cuts in military
personnel. 159
For instance, only two of the previously planned 12 Seawolf attack
submarines costing $33.6 billion will be built. President Bush had asked that only
one be produced but Congress insisted on two. 160 Additional savings would
result from the unilateral nuclear force initiatives the President announced in his
January 1992 State of the Union message. Production of the B-2 stealth bomber
being stopped at 20 planes would save $1 4.5 billion, cancellation of the Midgetman
nuclear missile would save $1 billion, and ending production of the advanced
cruise missile at 640 instead of 1,000 would save $1.3 billion. Production of the
Trident II missile would continue. However, production would be stopped on the
W-88 warhead. 161
The Pentagon hopes to achieve further savings by taking more time to move
systems from the research and design stage to production. A few systems that
would be affected by this new approach would be the Army's Comanche
159David C. Morrison, "Pentagons On A Downward Glide Path," National
Journal , February 1, 1992, p. 279.
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helicopter, the Army's Block III tank and LOSAT antitank missile, the Air Force's
Advanced Air to Air Missile, and the Navy's undersea surveillance system. 162
The President's plan requested approximately $6 billion for the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI). However, Congress only approved $4.1 billion of Bush's
request. The budget also contains a companion air defense program to be
developed against the threat of bombers and long-range cruise missiles and $25
million for an anti-satellite missile (ASAT). 163
Regarding personnel cuts, Bush's plan would result in 500,000 service
members, 500,000 federal civilians, and about 1 million workers in the defense
industry, losing their jobs during the next five years. 164 Army active duty and
reserve divisions would be cut from 26 in 1991 to 18 in 1995, Navy ships would
be reduced from 530 to 450, and tactical Air Force wings would be reduced from
34 to 26. 165 Overall, Bush's five-year defense plan would end in 1997 and cost
$1.43 trillion. The result would be a U.S. military that is 25% smaller then it was
in 1990. 166
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B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
What modifications to Bush's Base Force Plan can be expected from the
Clinton Administration? Clinton and Bush agree that the military of the post-Cold
War era should be a much smaller force. While Bush's plan called for the active
duty military to be reduced from 1.9 million down to 1.6 million troops by 1995,
Clinton has stated plans of going beyond and making an additional 200,000 cut in
force levels. However, Clinton has stated that he will not shrink military force
levels faster, but instead would continue the drawdown for two additional years
cutting 100,000 personnel each year. 167
President Bush has called for military spending to be at $1 .42 trillion through
1997, while Clinton is calling for this number to be further reduced to $1.36 trillion
for the same period. Most of the difference in spending would be gained from
further troop reductions and cuts to SDI. 168 President Bush is in favor of strong
missile defenses. Clinton is in favor of missile defense, including improved Patriot
missiles, but plans to cut $15-$20 billion from the Bush Administration's proposed
$37 billion for SDI research, mainly from space-based weapons. Clinton would
further slow development of a ground-based missile defense system until a clear
need is seen. 169
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While calling for further reductions, Clinton agrees with the current
Administration that the quality and ability of the U.S. military in the coming years
must be preserved. Clinton stated on September 15, "Our forces must be more
mobile, more precise and more flexible, and they must have the technologically
advanced weapons they need to prevail and to prevail quickly." 170
Both Bush and Clinton agree that military forces will be increasingly U.S.-
based in the coming years. While President Bush's plan called for the level of
troops in Europe to be reduced to 150,000 after 1995, Clinton believes this number
can be further reduced to between 75,000 and 100.000. 171
The Clinton Administration plans to make further reductions in the
composition of U.S. military forces. Clinton has stated intentions to cut the number
of aircraft carriers from the 12 proposed by President Bush to 10. Clinton has not
stated intentions to further reduce the number of Army divisions from 12 or Air
Force fighter wings from 26 that President Bush's plan called for. 172
Clinton favors development of new advanced weapons systems in order to
keep the U.S. military technologically superior to the rest of the world. Systems
170Governor Bill Clinton cited in Eric Schmitt, "Clinton and Bush Agree on
Trimming Armed Forces, but Their Paths Vary," The New York Times , October 21
,
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which Clinton supports include the F-22 fighter, C-17 transport, and V-22
Osprey. 173
Clinton and Bush also agree on the strategy of developing prototypes of
weapons systems while delaying full scale production until a clear need is
demonstrated. 174 However, some concern has been raised over this strategy in
Congress and the defense industry. Senator Malcolm Wallop has argued that any
new systems which are not actually produced and used are "nothing more than
interesting science projects, not practical solutions." 175 On this same subject,
Loren B. Thompson, Deputy Director of National Security Studies at Georgetown
University, has warned that cutting the defense budget too deeply would spell the
end of the defense industry. If the Pentagon shifted to an acquisition system
where production is carried out slowly, if at all, it would risk the loss of most of the
nation's defense production capacity and workers. Such a situation would place
a greater reliance on commercial sources of equipment and reduce the U.S. ability
to export its weapons systems. 176
How has the Bush Administration attempted to ease the blow of the defense
drawdown on local economies? How will the Clinton Administration approach this
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civilian and military personnel who will lose their jobs and communities that will be
faced with factory and base closings. However, these present agencies may be
inadequate to deal with the flow of workers that will flood an already weak
economy. 177 The Clinton Administration states that it will devote Federal money
to "communication, transportation, new environmental technology, and other
infrastructure projects." in order to assist in finding jobs for those workers affected
by defense cuts. 178
There is some disagreement between Bush and Clinton about how to
proceed in reducing the U.S. defense budget and the U.S. military presence in
Europe. However, the overall changes that the Clinton Administration will make
to President Bush's plan will probably be small. "The shape, size and mission of
the armed forces in the future would not be radically different under Republican or
Democratic administrations." 179 As Georgetown University's National Security
Studies Program has concluded, "A Clinton Presidency would not fundamentally
alter the current content of U.S. national security policies."
180
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C. CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS REGARDING THE FUTURE SECURITY NEEDS
OF THE UNITED STATES
Members from both parties in Congress are calling for the U.S. to reevaluate
its defense needs in the new security environment. Lee H. Hamilton believes the
issues are no longer Communist expansion or the nuclear threat. Instead, the
U.S. needs to deal with the problems of "economic competitiveness, weapons
proliferation, support for democracy, protection of the environment, and the fight
against human misery." Hamilton believes the U.S. needs to redefine its role in
the world.
181
In a period when congressmen see their local districts absorbing the shock
of defense drawdowns, many are intensifying their calls for a reduction of U.S.
involvement in European security affairs. Politicians are finding it hard to justify
keeping troops overseas when bases, such as Williams Air Force Base in Arizona,
are being closed, with economic harm to their districts. Some of these feelings are
understandable. Washington is paying more each year to maintain the U.S.
military presence overseas even though this money insures access to fewer bases.
Host nations are demanding more money as compensation for a U.S. military
presence. Foreign aid relating to military bases has risen from $200 million
annually in 1974 to roughly $2 billion in 1990. If the situation were not changing,
the U.S. would be paying close to $3 billion for its foreign military presence by the
181 Lee H. Hamilton, p. 32.
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mid-1 990's. 182 Therefore, Congress is generally in favor of additional cuts to
U.S. force levels in Europe. Senator Tom Harkin notes that 60% of the Pentagon's
budget was to be directed toward the U.S. commitment to NATO. "That is about
$160 billion a year that we are spending to stop an attack by a military force that
no longer exists led by a country that no longer exists." 183 While not favoring
total withdrawal, many congressmen want a greater detachment from the U.S.
commitment to Europe.
The discussion surrounding the required level of U.S. commitment to
European security will likely continue for some time. During this period the U.S.
military presence in Europe will definitely change. While the exact figures are still
under debate, it is inevitable that the U.S. military presence in Europe and its
defense budget will be sharply reduced over the next several years. However, it
is doubtful Congress will seek deeper cuts than what Clinton is planning to
implement. Congress appears hesitant to cut more because of the economy's
weak state and the detrimental effect that Bush's cuts have already had on the
defense industry and local communities. 184
Senate Armed Services Committee member William S. Cohen, R-Maine,
agrees with the level of military presence in Europe that Clinton has endorsed.
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Cohen believes even keeping 75,000 to 100,000 troops will have to be defended,
however. Cohen has said that the American people have to be convinced that a
continued U.S. military presence is necessary. 185 Cohen and other legislators
have described the difficulty in gaining support for the U.S. role as a guarantor of
European security in the current political climate. Cohen states, "The lamps of
history are being extinguished by the winds of recession and unemployment." 186
If 100,000 to 125,000 is the maximum number of U.S. troops that will be
stationed in Europe, how low can the American military presence shrink while still
providing a believable commitment? The number of troops necessary in order to
provide a believable commitment cannot be determined with precision. Some
argue that keeping a U.S. military presence in Europe is more important than its
actual operational capabilities. 187 From this viewpoint, a reasonable figure for
the lower limit would be 50,000 troops located in several garrisons and air bases.
These troops would act as a "tripwire" and provide a foundation for the return of
a larger force, if it should be deemed necessary. 188
185Cohen cited in Pat Towell, "Bush's Europe Troop Plan Faces Some Paring,
Lawmakers Say," p. 360.
186jbid.
187
Robert A. Levine and David A. Ochmanek, p. 15.
188




D. PUBLIC OPINION SUPPORTS A U.S. GLOBAL ROLE.
Much analysis has been done to understand how Congress, the Bush
Administration, and the Clinton Administration are reshaping U.S. foreign policy.
However, less study has been devoted to showing how these changes interact with
the buildup of a strong desire in the American public to change the status quo.
The American public is expressing mistrust, anxiety, and a determination to change
government. 189 The desire for change in the U.S. public has the potential to
affect the changes being made in U.S. foreign and defense policy.
By choosing and influencing Presidents and legislators, the U.S. public has
an indirect ability to affect U.S. defense policy. Also, Congress is vulnerable to
lobbying by interest groups. Since Congress, especially the House of
Representatives, is driven to a large extent by public opinion, studying public
opinion on national security matters and the defense budget might help shed light
on what Congress will be motivated to do. Since the public could be considered
uninformed and therefore unqualified regarding national security issues, some
might argue that its opinions should not be trusted. However, the point can be
made that most elected Representatives are merely members of the public with
roughly the same level of knowledge about defense policy as their constituents. 190
189
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190Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Democratizing U.S. Defense Policy , Prepared for
Delivery at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, August 30 through September 2, 1990, p. 3.
80
Furthermore, recent studies regarding the role of public opinion in U.S. arms
debates show the public to be relatively aware of the issues. 191 The growth of
the media and television news deserves part of the credit for making defense
issues more prominent. In the 1960s, growing concern for the economy created
even greater public interest in national defense issues. 192 An overview of recent
polls of the American public provides interesting information about the public's
feelings towards the Former Soviet Union, NATO, American military strength, and
the role of the U.S. in the changing international security environment.
American public opinion varies widely given the issue being surveyed. Public
opinion goes from a "raw opinion" or "knee jerk" type of reaction at one extreme
to a responsible informed opinion at the other. "Raw opinion" views are expressed
when the public has taken little time to evaluate and investigate the issues. The
public has not evaluated the trade-offs and choices necessary in making a
responsible judgement on the matter. Fortunately, in matters of defense and
foreign policy, the public has become better informed. The experience of two
world wars and the Cold War has given the American public time to evaluate the
options and weigh the pros and cons of the major foreign policy issues. 193
The attention that Pat Buchanan received with his "America First" slogan led
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in their views towards foreign policy. At first glance, public opinion polls seemed
to echo this belief. However, upon closer examination, underneath U.S. public
opinion calling for greater attention to be given to domestic problems there is a
strong commitment to internationalism. Strong majorities (71 percent) feel that
America must take an active part in world affairs. 194
Regarding the breakup of the Soviet Union, Americans are concerned about
nuclear control issues. Americans support U.S. cuts in nuclear forces and hope
that the FSU will do the same. However, Americans feel that the FSU cannot be
trusted without formal treaties. 195
With regard to NATO and U.S. military strength, even though a majority of
Americans agree that the Cold War is over, they feel the U.S. must still be on
guard. By a majority of 5 to 1 Americans believe that the U.S. should maintain its
alliance with Western Europe. Regarding U.S. military strength, Americans
consider the U.S. to be strong militarily and want it to stay that way. Ninety-one
percent view the U.S. as the preeminent military power in the world. A majority
of U.S. citizens, sixty-seven percent, are satisfied with the current levels of
spending on national defense. Looking twenty-five years into the future, eighty
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world. 196 On the role of the U.S. in the changing security environment, "public
support for using American troops in crisis situations continues to be
selective."
197 Americans favor using U.S. troops if a crisis should arise in
Western Europe but they are reluctant to provide support for their use elsewhere.
However, there are two exceptions. Americans would favor using U.S. troops to
repel an invasion of South Korea by North Korea or an Arab attack on Israel. 198
In a Gallup Poll published in October of 1991, about fifty percent of
Americans felt defense spending was too high, thirty-six percent felt it was the right
amount, while ten percent felt it was too little, and four percent of Americans had
no opinion. These figures may be compared with those in an August of 1990 poll
which resulted in forty-one percent of Americans saying defense spending was too
high, forty percent saying it was the right amount, fifteen percent feeling it was too
low, with four percent again having no opinion. 199
E. THE INFORMED PUBLIC
Perhaps one the most beneficial sources of data was a Gallup poll performed
between October 23 and November 15, 1990. The Gallup organization conducted
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a survey in which 1 ,662 men and women were surveyed, along with 377 leaders
from the Bush Administration, Congress, international business, labor, the media,
academic and religious organizations, and special interest groups. Findings of this
survey were supplemented by Gallup polls conducted in January 1991. This poll
provides an effective analysis of how the feelings of the average American
compare with those of political, religious and economic leaders in the United States
on issues of foreign policy. These surveys found sharp differences in some areas
between public opinion and that of the "attentive public". 200
One area of agreement between the two groups was the Soviet Union. Both
groups felt that the threat from the Soviet Union has receded over the past few
years. They no longer view the Soviet Union as the principal adversary of the
United States, as they did four years ago.201
Both groups feel that the U.S. should continue to play an active role in world
affairs. However, a growing sense of economic vulnerability has both groups
divided on the issue of whether the U.S. plays a more important role in world
affairs now than it did 10 years ago. Both groups believe that, because the U.S.
has been unable to solve its pressing economic problems, it has declined as a
world power.202
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The two groups expressed differing opinions on some issues. Each group
was asked to identify the two or three biggest U.S. foreign policy problems. The
mass public did not place the U.S.-Russian relationship within the top ten.
However, leaders placed the U.S. -Russian relationship third. Even this reflects a
25% drop in importance from four years ago. 203
Even with the current preoccupation in the U.S. over domestic issues, public
opinion showed almost two thirds (62%) favoring a continued strong U.S. role in
the world. This figure was down only slightly from four years ago. The American
public seems to be increasingly aware that global interdependence has grown and
makes a major impact on the overall economy at home. 204 Furthermore, 30%
of the public and 41% of the leaders expressed the feeling that future economic
competition with Europe will become a threat to the United States. 205
Public opinion is in favor of cutting the defense budget and reducing the U.S.
military presence overseas. Late in 1990, 53% of the public wanted to maintain
defense spending at the current level, 12% felt it needed to be increased, and 32%
were in favor of reducing it. A poll of the leadership in America indicated that 21%
wanted to keep defense spending the same, 2% wished to expand it, and 77%










Regarding NATO, 56% of the American public want to preserve the present
level of commitment and 22% want to reduce it. However, in polling the
leadership, 35% express the desire to maintain the present level of commitment
to NATO and 57% are in favor of reducing it. These figures reflect the impact the
end of the Cold War has had on public opinion towards foreign policy. 207
When given alternative levels of troop strengths in Europe to choose from,
the American public was in favor of maintaining approximately 181,300 troops in
Europe. The leaders favored a greater decrease in overseas presence; they
expressed the desire for an average level of 101,200 personnel. Only a small
percentage of the American public and leaders favors drastic changes to either
extreme regarding the U.S. military presence in Europe or cuts in defense
spending. 208 Furthermore, contrary to claims made by some congressmen, little
support was found in the opinion surveys for having Germany or Japan increase
their military roles. While there is support for decreasing the U.S. troop
commitment to Europe, 59% of the public and 65% of the leaders are against
Japan or Germany increasing their military capabilities. 209
These polls show an American public that is inclined to cautiously regard the
Former Soviet Union. The public believes that the threat from the FSU is declining








Russia and the other successor states. Americans judge that it is important to
retain the nation's overseas alliances. They believe that the U.S. should use these
alliances to deal with major security threats. Americans favor reducing the defense
budget and the U.S. military presence in Europe as long as the U.S. is able to
remain the strongest military power in the world. However, the American public
is against Japan or Germany increasing its military power to "pick up the slack."
Will public opinion on these issues be loud enough for Congress to hear?
The lack of a clear threat to U.S. national security could answer this question.
Without the perception of a threat, public opinion as a motivating force in
Washington may grow weaker in the future. 210
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is important that the U.S. be steadfast during the transition that is taking
place in Europe. 1989 was seen as a new beginning for Europe. The tendency
might surface among impatient analysts or policy-makers to speed the process of
change, regardless of the pitfalls that may be present. However, this attitude could
endanger the stable transition to a free and prosperous Europe. After peace
dividends were harvested and U.S. forces were withdrawn from Europe, it would
require massive effort and expense to return forces to Europe should it become
necessary. Steps must be taken positively and decisively with an awareness that
they cannot be easily reversed.
While some might argue that history doesn't repeat itself and that Europe has
learned from past mistakes, certain themes in history have a way of reappearing
in changing guises. 211 "Although expensive, deterring war is cheaper than
having to fight one."212 Though costly, America's European investment has
yielded enormous benefits. It has provided years of peace on a continent that, in
an ever-shrinking world, plays a critical role in the national security of the United
States.
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